e aim of this essay is to address the topic of anthropocentrism by focusing on the concept of 'culture' as it has been shaped within the humanities and anthropological thought (by scholars such as Herder, Tylor, Boas, Kroeber, and Geertz). More speci cally, the human/ animal divide and its connotations will be analysed, in order to shed light on how the de nition of the culture concept has generated an unbridgeable hiatus between the two domains. Given this consideration, two questions arise: is it fair to accuse cultural anthropology-the discipline that occupies itself with 'culture'-of being anthro pocentric? And is 'culture' the very trait which de nes and characterises 'humanity' as opposed to 'animality'? Nature (Animals) vs. Culture (Humans) e re ection on the nature/culture divide, and on the supposed boundary between humanity and animality, is a topos in anthropological thought. e relationship between nature and culture, humans and animals, innate and learned behaviours, phylogeny and ontogeny, and other correlated topics have been discussed within the discipline in the past, but they currently seem to have lost their appeal to mainstream anthropology. However, I believe that re-analysis of the human/animal divide can play a central role in updating social sciences in general. In other words, I am convinced that it is not possible to work properly on de ning human culture from an anthropological perspective without having previously untied the Gordian knot of the human/animal opposition.
is speculation does not regard humans and animals as categories per se. It will be drawn against the background of a wider reconsideration of the core tenets of cultural and social anthropology: to be more precise, I refer to those heuristic devices, cultural categories and concepts commonly used by anthropologists in arguing about humans and animals, nature and culture, which present a certain ambiguity, and therefore require critical scrutiny.
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Dichotomies
Iconically, in binary opposition to the human, counterpart animals are polysemic representations in the process of human autopoiesis. From this reductive and mechanistic perspective, animality functions as a de ner of humanity. However, the human/animal dichotomy constitutes an unveri ed a priori assumption on which the development of anthropological discourse regarding humans, human cultures, etc. is based. It seems therefore necessary to clarify what the content of each of these opposite concepts is, and to verify the heuristic value of the opposition itself.
In many respects it is possible to de ne the dominion encompassed by the term 'human', since we refer to one species, 2 homo sapiens, and we can trace its ethos, as the anthropos (humankind). But when it comes to the opposing polarity, animals, the lack of homogeneity within the category creates an impasse, because animals 2 However, the concept of 'species' complicates the matter, instead of simplifying it. In fact, as it is shown by taxonomic studies, there is no clear-cut de nition of 'species'. While we learn form Mayr that 'species are groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups', and from Lancaster that 'species' is 'the basic taxon among sexually reproducing animals', we should also note, e following admonition from Darwin's e Origin of Species warns us against the risk of 'naturalising' categories and essentialism: 'we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera, who admit that genera are merely arti cial combinations made for convenience. is may not be a cheering prospect; but we shall at least be free from the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the term species' (quoted in David L. Hull, ' e E ect of Essentialism on Taxonomy-Two ousand Years of Stasis', e British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 15:60 (1965) , 320).
